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Abstract 
This paper discusses the relevant cost standard for the economic replicability test for Next-Generation 
Access (NGA) networks, described in the Recommendation on Costing and Non-discrimination 
adopted by the European Commission. According to the Recommendation itself, in order to reconcile 
investment and competition, wholesale prices should have nonlinear characteristics and be only partly 
variable with the number of accesses. We demonstrate that a cost standard for the economic 
replicability test that implies fully fixed and variable cost recovery for the access seeker, including the 
total wholesale price, would be incompatible with the economics of NGA networks and that such a 
test would deter NGA investment. Therefore the cost standard for the economic replicability test 
should include only the variable part of the wholesale prices. However, we underline that during a 
transition phase, until competitors have secured access to NGA infrastructure, a temporary second test 
called the “competition migration test” should be added to ensure incumbent NGA retail prices do not 
foreclose copper-based efficient entrants. The tests we propose surpass the limits of the “ladder of 
investment” theory by including the “business migration effect” developed by Bourreau et al. (2012).  
Keywords 
Margin squeeze test; Regulation; Next-generation access networks 
JEL codes: L51, L96 
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1. Introduction* 
On 12 July 2012, Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission (EC) charged with the 
Digital Agenda, announced a far-reaching set of measures to enhance the broadband investment 
environment in order to meet the objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) by 2020. Neelie 
Kroes considered that regulatory policy for next-generation access (NGA) must be based on the 
following key elements: stable copper prices based on BU-LRIC+ cost model and flexible, not cost 
oriented,  NGA wholesale access prices combined with high non-discrimination obligations, including 
“a properly-specified ex ante margin squeeze test.” 
Details of the test are provided in the European Commission (2013) recommendation 
“Commission Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing 
methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment” adopted 
by the European Commission on 11 September 2013. In this Recommendation, the ex ante margin 
squeeze test was renamed “economic replicability test” to avoid any confusion with the margin 
squeeze test used ex post by competition authorities. 
The Recommendation (see Annex II p.27-29 for detailed specifications), suggests that the test 
should be done with a discounted cash flow (DCF) on an average customer lifetime and account for 
long-run incremental costs plus (LRIC+) as a cost standard. At the same time, for the EC, the costing 
methodology should guarantee an “appropriate balance between ensuring efficient entry and sufficient 
incentives to invest.” According to the document, this would imply allowing operators investing in 
NGA networks a certain degree of pricing flexibility. This flexibility would enable significant market 
power (SMP) operators and access seekers to “share some of the investment risk by differentiating 
wholesale access prices according to the access seeker’s level of commitment.” The EC views volume 
discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements as important tools for fostering NGA 
investment. This implies that the total wholesale price paid by the access seeker is not necessarily 
strictly proportional to the number of accesses, as the wholesale price may include elements such as a 
minimum fee, discounts above given volumes, upfront payment or co-financing arrangements. For the 
purposes of this article, we will conceptually model all these forms of nonlinear wholesale access price 
structures as “two-part tariffs”. In this simplified model, the variable part of the wholesale “two-part 
tariff” is by definition the part of the wholesale price actually paid by the access seeker which is 
proportional to its number of accesses. All other components of the wholesale price will be 
considered as part of the fixed part of the wholesale price. 
This type of price structure reflects the underlying investment cost structure for an operator which 
invests in fibre in order to replace its copper access network, since a large part of its investment cost is 
fixed, independent of demand that is otherwise uncertain. In this case, the economic analysis shows 
that optimal wholesale prices should include this type of fixed component in order to effectively 
allocate the risk that fixed costs may not be covered if demand is low. In this context, the proportion of 
the access network cost that may be legitimately subject to a form of nonlinear wholesale pricing 
depends of the proportion of the copper access network which the incumbent operator replaces with 
fibre. Thus when NGAs take the form of FTTN (“Fibre to the Node”) or FTTC (“Fibre to the 
Cabinet”) for which only a limited proportion of copper is replaced by fibre, wholesale prices are only 
weakly nonlinear, for instance through limited volume discounts: in this scenario, a large part of the 
wholesale price stays variable and the fixed part is relatively small. On the other hand, when NGAs 
take the form of FTTH (“Fibre to the Home”) for which the copper access network is completely 
replaced by fibre, wholesale prices may be more strongly nonlinear, using approaches like co-
financing of the fixed infrastructure, significant upfront payment or more significant volume or 
                                                     
*
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duration discounts. In this case, the proportion of the total wholesale price which is actually 
proportional to the number of access is lower. 
This paper addresses the question of how to implement t h e  Re c o mme n d a t i o n ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  h o w  t o  u s e  the economic replicability test t o  r e g u l a t e  NGA w h o l e s a l e  
p r i c e .  As we will see, the Recommendation itself suggests that wholesale prices may have a 
nonlinear structure. Determining how to implement the test when wholesale prices are nonlinear 
requires further investigation: academics and institutions have analysed “margin squeeze” in depth 
(see for instance Jullien, Rey, Saavedra (2013) for an overview) but only in the case of linear 
wholesale prices. To the best of our knowledge, the question of our how economic replicability or 
margin squeeze tests should be implemented when wholesale prices are nonlinear has not been 
formally analysed. Moreover, the test must be structured to fulfil the EC’s dual objective of 
encouraging NGA investment and maintaining the competitive structure inherited from copper 
unbundling, while obeying the principle of fair investment risk distribution between access provider 
and access seekers
1
. The novelty of this paper is also our proposal for a solution for two-part 
wholesale prices, with different and complementary regulatory regimes for the variable and fixed parts 
of wholesale prices. 
The paper mainly addresses the case of total replacement of the copper infrastructure by a NGA 
network. However, our proposal would remain valid in intermediate situations requiring partial 
replacement of copper network, but its significance would be reduced in due proportion. 
Although the paper directly refers to the EC Recommendation on Costing Methodology and Non-
discrimination, the economic arguments would also be suitable for a margin squeeze test under 
competition law. 
The objective of this paper is to address a key implementation issue of the 2013 EC 
Recommendation on non-discrimination and costing. Therefore it does not cover important subjects 
for access regulation which are not covered in the Recommendation, such as geographical 
segmentation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the notion of “economic 
replicability test” and details the EC formulation in the draft Recommendation on Cost Orientation 
and Non-discrimination. Section 3 is the core of the paper. In Section 3, we demonstrate that a test 
which implies full fixed and variable cost recovery would deter NGA investment. We show that to 
reconcile investment and competition, the economic replicability test should only include the variable 
part of wholesale prices. However, during a transitional phase until competitors have migrated from 
copper to NGA network, a temporary test called the “competition migration test” should be added to 
ensure that the incumbent does not foreclose copper-based efficient entrants. Finally, in Section 4, we 
discuss how our proposal of a dual-test system can be integrated into existing regulatory theory and 
practice. 
2. Economic Replicability test: definition and EC formulation of the test for NGA 
Networks 
In the Recommendation on Cost Orientation and Non-discrimination published on September 11, 
2013, the European Commission advocates allowing for a certain degree of pricing flexibility for NGA 
services. This results in the non-imposition or lifting of regulated wholesale access prices on the NGA 
network. This flexibility is considered by the EC as without prejudice to the extent that the upstream 
and downstream prices are constrained by an ex ante economic replicability test. 
                                                     
1
 EC Recommendation C(2013) 5761 final, 11.9.2013 on non-discrimination and costing. Annex II «When setting the 
parameters of the ex-ante economic replicability test, NRAs should ensure that the SMP operator is not put at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis access seekers regarding the sharing of the investment risk. » 
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2.1 General definition of ex ante economic replicability and margin squeeze test 
The term “economic replicability test” has been used by the EC to avoid any confusion with the 
margin squeeze test used ex post by competition authorities. However, the term “ex ante margin 
squeeze test” is frequently used in the literature and the practice of National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) on broadband access products that use the copper pair. 
Regulatory policy and competition policy address the common objective of ensuring efficient 
market competition for the benefit of consumers. However, the two policies address different sides of 
the issue. Competition policy is designed to preserve competition in a market where competition is 
established, and would act ex post if a dominant company is alleged to have abused its position to 
harm competitors and consumers. Competition authorities base their margin squeeze test on case law. 
In the telecommunications industry, three notable cases (Deutsche Telekom in 2003, Telefónica in 
2007 and TeliaSonera in 2011) substantially contributed to the definition of margin squeeze. 
Regulatory policy aims to promote competition and act ex ante to prevent abuses in specific markets 
characterized by a monopoly or a company with significant market power. 
There is a margin squeeze when a vertically-integrated company that provides essential input 
to downstream competitors charges retail and input prices that do not leave a sufficient economic 
margin for efficient competitors to make positive profits. Therefore, there is no margin squeeze if the 
customer retail price for the incumbent’s downstream branch covers its upstream and downstream 
costs (Gaudin and Saavedra (2013)): 
 
p ≥ a + c 
where “p” is the retail price, “a” is the wholesale access charge per access and “c” is the downstream 
cost per customer. 
This condition guarantees that an efficient competitor could not be excluded from the market. The 
equation above shows that the test is clearly specified only when wholesale prices are proportional to 
the volume of access. 
European Union competition law, clearly expressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 
TeliaSonera and Deutsche Telecom judgments, recognizes margin squeeze as a separate, stand-alone 
form of abusive behaviour prohibited by Article 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union. This view is in contrast to the US Supreme Court’s view. In the Linkline case, the 
US Supreme Court rejected the very notion that a margin squeeze itself could constitute a separate 
form of Sherman Act §2 violation. Instead, it limited the claim to cases where vertically-integrated 
companies apply predatory pricing in the downstream market. 
In the European view, the occurrence of a margin squeeze is, however, subject to several 
conditions explicitly mentioned in the Court’s TeliaSonera decision, and it is not clear whether these 
conditions will be met if we apply the test to the NGA context. Our study, however, is not intended to 
debate this question. The present analysis is dedicated to constructive propositions for building the 
economic replicability test. 
2.2 Economic Replicability test for NGA Networks in the European Commission Recommendation 
on cost Orientation and Non-discrimination 
The deployment of NGAs is one of the core objectives of the 2020 Digital Agenda for Europe. 
The economic replicability test should therefore preserve the competitive structure inherited from 
unbundling regulation of the copper local loop and promote efficient investment and innovation in new 
infrastructures. The EC has to ensure that the ex ante economic replicability test for NGAs allows for 
an appropriate balance between these two objectives. 
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The Recommendation specifies the different parameters of the test, i.e. the relevant downstream 
costs, the relevant cost standard, the relevant regulated wholesale inputs, the relevant retail products 
and the relevant time period for running the test. 
The relevant downstream costs are “estimated on the basis of the costs of the SMP operator’s own 
downstream businesses (EEO test). NRAs should use the SMP operator’s audited downstream 
costs, provided they are sufficiently disaggregated.” 
According to the Recommendation, the relevant cost standard is the long-run incremental costs plus 
(LRIC+) including sunk costs. 
NRAs should identify the most relevant regulated input used or expected to be used by access 
seekers. 
NRAs should also define the most relevant retail products including broadband services, i.e. 
“flagship products” offered by the SMP operator on the basis of their market observations. Those 
observations should include an assessment of retail market shares in volume and value. 
Finally, NRAs should measure the profitability of the flagship products on the basis of a dynamic 
multi-period analysis, such as the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach on an average customer 
lifetime. 
2.3 The EC Recommendation encourages nonlinear wholesale price structures 
The Recommendationitself, particularly in Recitals (19)
2
 and also (49), opens the way to using 
nonlinear wholesale prices. Pricing flexibility must allow SMP operators and access seekers to share 
the investment risks by differentiating wholesale access prices according to the access seeker’s level of 
commitment. In this context, volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements are 
considered by the EC as important tools for fostering NGA investment.  
The use of nonlinear access prices is also in line with the principles adopted in articles 8
3
 and12
4
 of 
the framework directive. The principle of nonlinear wholesale access pricing was also already 
acknowledged in the September 2010 NGA Recommendation (2010/572/EU) in Recital (25)
5
. In this 
NGA Recommendation, the European Commission advocated mutualisation and co-investment, which 
are also forms of nonlinear access price and comprise two elements, one fixed and the other variable 
In the NGA context, a nonlinear access charge would be composed of: 
 A wholesale variable access price that is directly proportional to the number of customers; 
 Other elements of the wholesale price which are not proportional to the volume of access and 
which will hereafter be considered part of the fixed wholesale price which does not vary with the 
volume of access. 
                                                     
2
 “Volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements are an important tool to foster NGA investment. …” 
3
 Art.8.5.(d) FWD “promoting efficient investment and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by 
ensuring that any access obligation takes appropriate account of the risk incurred by the investing undertakings and by 
permitting various cooperative arrangements between investors and parties seeking access to diversify the risk of 
investment, whilst ensuring that competition in the market and the principle of non-discrimination are preserved;” 
4
 Art.12.3. FWD “…have the power to impose obligations in relation to the sharing of wiring inside buildings or up to the 
first concentration or distribution point where this is located outside the building, on the holders of the rights referred to 
in paragraph 1 and/or on the owner of such wiring, where this is justified on the grounds that duplication of such 
infrastructure would be economically inefficient or physically impracticable. Such sharing or coordination arrangements 
may include rules for apportioning the costs of facility or property sharing adjusted for risk where appropriate.” 
5
 “Where SMP operators offer lower access prices for the unbundled fibre loop in return for up-front commitments on 
long-term or volume contracts, these should not be regarded as unduly discriminatory where NRAs are satisfied that the 
lower prices appropriately reflect an actual reduction of the investment risk.” 
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This type of wholesale price structure is consistent with the cost structure of the investment, where 
there are necessarily both a fixed cost for shared infrastructure deployment, and specific costs 
incurred for each new customer on the NGA infrastructure. 
The two-part wholesale price structures encouraged by the Recommendation on NGAs are also 
in line with lessons from the economics analysis, as based on the existing literature, two-part tariffs 
are a good instrument for solving the dynamic consistency and regulatory commitment issues by 
conciliating access obligations and investment incentives. 
Most of the literature on competition policy considers linear access tariffs in accordance with the 
past practices of regulatory authorities. Until recently, regulatory authorities had been dealing with 
existing infrastructures without seeking to promote investment with an increasing return to scale, 
therefore linear pricing was sufficient. Furthermore, in the access and interconnection pricing 
literature, nonlinear access prices are hardly discussed, unlike nonlinear downstream prices 
(Vogelsang (2003)). However, nonlinear risk sharing arrangements were already been advocated in 
2009 by Nitsche and Wiethaus (2009). 
Later, Brito et al. (2010) suggested that as new technological developments provide an 
opportunity to invest in new infrastructures, “it comes as natural that, in light of these changes, 
regulators should use new regulatory instruments.” In this context, the addition of a fixed fee appears 
to the authors as the obvious solution. Brito et al. (2010) study this specific issue in a duopoly model 
where a vertically-integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant compete. The regulator sets the 
access tariff to the incumbent’s network. They point out that the trade-off may generate a “dynamic 
consistency problem.” Before the network is deployed, it is socially optimal to a set high access 
charge to encourage investment. After the network is deployed, it is socially optimal to lower 
the access tariff to promote competition in the retail market. The authors show that this dynamic 
consistency problem has a negative impact on NGA investment. “The incumbent anticipates that it 
will be expropriated from the incremental profit of its investment and reduces investment.” They 
demonstrate that two-part tariffs can solve this dynamic consistency issue because the regulator 
obtains an additional instrument—the fixed fee—to encourage the incumbent to invest. If the 
investment cost is low, the regulator can set the marginal price for the access tariff at marginal cost 
and use the fixed fee as an incentive for the incumbent to invest. If the investment cost amounts to an 
intermediate value, the fixed fee is no longer enough to induce investment. The regulator has to raise 
the marginal price of the access tariff above marginal cost. In these circumstances, a regulatory 
moratorium could emerge as socially optimal. Two-part access prices and a degree of price flexibility 
are thus complementary instruments. If the investment cost is high, investment is not socially 
desirable. 
Lestage and Flacher (2011) also find in their model on investment games that a two-part tariff 
results in better social welfare than a linear access price. They found that the flat fee reduces the 
optimal variable fee and that the variable part should be cost-oriented only when service- based 
competition is feasible. The variable fee is above marginal cost when facility-based competition is 
possible. Raising the access price reduces welfare under service-based competition and makes 
duplication more socially desirable, which in turn improves welfare. 
On the other hand, Tselekounis and Varoutas (2013) analyse the relationship between NGA 
investments and access prices under regulatory uncertainty, a contrario showing that under a linear 
wholesale price setting, it is difficult for regulation to provide socially desirable incentives. 
To summarise, a degree of wholesale price flexibility appears necessary for NGA regulation. 
- Flexibility in wholesale price structures: nonlinear or two-part access charges as advocated in the 
EC Recommendation are an adequate instrument, on the wholesale price side, to reconcile 
downstream competition and upstream investment. 
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- Flexibility in wholesale price levels: according to the EC Recommendation, NGA wholesale 
prices should not be cost-oriented if the NGA infrastructure is under the competitive pressure of 
other access platforms, including legacy copper infrastructure.  
2.4 How an economic replicabilty test should be applied with two-part wholesale pricing ? 
Variable fees are much easier for regulatory authorities to regulate than fixed fees. Fixed fees are 
particularly difficult for to regulate because they presuppose a rule for spreading the fixed costs 
among operators. It may be possible to spread fixed costs based on market share. However, in a 
growing market, this distribution is likely to become invalid very quickly. It would seem difficult and 
hardly effective to constantly adapt regulations to market characteristics. Moreover, this would de 
facto transform the fixed fee into a variable price, under the form of a mark-up on top of the variable 
price, thus eliminating the economic benefits of a two-part access price structure.  
A two-part structure makes it possible to accurately consider the singularity of an NGA 
investor’s cost structure characterized by a significant part of fixed costs. 
However, the compatibility between the objectives of the European Commission and the 
parameters of the test is not self-evident. An LRIC + test as required by the Recommendation could 
be formally interpreted taking into consideration both the fixed and variable parts of the wholesale 
price, if the fixed part of the wholesale price is included in the cost base, for instance in reference to 
the “+” of the LRIC + cost standard. But since the fixed part of wholesale prices reflects high NGA 
investment costs with a long and uncertain payback period, it would be inappropriate to include the 
fixed wholesale price in the test using a DCF method on a customer lifetime. Applying this method 
yields systematically negative test results. If we consider an infrastructure’s lifetime, results would be 
at least as uncertain as the long term profitability of the NGA investment itself. 
It is difficult to find a formal way to regulate both fixed and variable fees based on a single 
condition, particularly given that, as we have seen, fixed fees are by nature very difficult to regulate. 
In the section 3, we will demonstrate that these reasons imply leaving the wholesale fixed price 
out of the test; only the variable price is constrained in the economic replicability test we propose in 
this paper. It guarantees there is no discrimination on the basis of variable costs for all operators with 
access to NGA infrastructure. 
The issue of the level of the wholesale fixed price and the migration of competitors from copper 
infrastructure to NGA infrastructure will be addressed separately and introduce a second 
complementary “competition migration test.” 
3. Two tests that resolve the dilemma of maintaining competition while encouraging 
NGA investment 
In this section, we first demonstrate that an economic replicability test that includes fully fixed and 
variable cost recovery for the access seeker would be inappropriate in an NGA context because all 
NGA investment risk would be concentrated on the access provider and none on the access seeker, in 
contradiction with the objective formulated in Annex II of the Recommendation “not to put the 
SMP operator at a disadvantage”, thereby discouraging investment. We then describe the 
characteristics of the economic replicability test that should be applied. This test includes only variable 
costs and excludes the fixed part of the wholesale price from the cost standard to guarantee fair and 
vibrant competition between access providers and access seekers, once access seekers have managed 
to secure access to the NGA infrastructure. Lastly, we describe a second “competition migration test” 
designed to put access providers and seekers on a level field for negotiating wholesale fixed prices and 
ensure a competitive market structure is maintained during the migration from copper to NGA 
infrastructure. 
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3.1 A cost standard that includes fully fixed and variable cost recovery in the economic replicability 
test for NGA networks would be inappropriate and discourage investment  
The European Commission Communication (2013) states on page 4: “Divergent regulation of fixed 
networks often means overregulation, or regulatory uncertainty and unpredictability, making it hard to 
plan investment in fast, “next generation” broadband networks.” and on page 7: “Legal certainty is 
particularly important given that investment in fast broadband networks incurs significant costs, while 
demand for end product remains uncertain.” The European Commission Recommendation (2013) 
states on pages 2 and 3 that investment in broadband networks must be promoted and triggered. 
Instilling confidence in investors is essential, as is long term predictability “beyond the lifetime of an 
individual market review”. These quotes show that the Commission does not take NGA investment for 
granted and acknowledges that the profitability of NGA investment is uncertain. The NGA market in 
most European countries is entering a transitional phase. For the moment, the demand for NGA 
networks is still weak and gradual. It is following an S-curve where the initial investment is 
massive and deployment time is long. 
The weakness of the demand is inherent to the small number of services which are only possible 
over very fast broadband. This undoubtedly has an impact on consumer willingness to pay for 
NGA services. Rosston et al. (2010) point out that the difference in American consumer willingness to 
pay for fast or very fast broadband is low (about $3.00). 
However, a short-term pricing policy aimed at achieving immediate economic equilibrium would 
be counterproductive because it would lead to prohibitive prices. There is thus a conflict 
between retail prices that allow retail earnings to cover full costs and retail prices that consumers are 
willing to pay
6
.  
This analysis of NGA investment profitability is highly relevant for the specification of the test 
since it affects the economic replicability test results. If the cost standard of the test includes all fixed 
and variable costs (LRIC + approach), as in the analysis of NGA investment profitability, and if the 
latter is uncertain in the long term and negative in the short term, then a positive test result (i.e. proof 
that a potential sufficient margin lets competitors enter the market, a guarantee of positive business 
for access seekers) can be obtained only if the access provider’s wholesale business is uncertain in the 
long term and negative in the short term, as we will formally demonstrate below. Using this type of 
test, access seekers and access providers would compete on equal footing in the retail market, but 
access seekers would benefit from guaranteed profitability thanks to the economic replicability test, 
while the access provider would bear all the investment risks. Access seekers would be much better 
off than access providers and no one would have an interest in investing. 
This can be formalised by the following simple reasoning. The profit of NGA activity (or NGA 
Business Case “NGA BC”) for a regulated network operator investing in NGA and which has NGA 
retail and wholesale activities can be expressed as follows: 
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 This is also true on the wholesale market: a conventional BU LRIC+ cost-oriented linear wholesale access price applied 
to NGA infrastructure with low penetration rates would lead to prohibitively high values which are incompatible with 
adoption by any customers. 
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Where m is the market share of the access provider in the retail market, retail revenues are revenues 
per unit of market share for the regulated operator, and downstream costs and upstream costs are costs 
per unit of market share for the regulated operator for its retail activities and wholesale activities 
(including investment in NGA infrastructure) respectively. As the regulated operator is subject to non-
discrimination obligations, its upstream costs per unit of market share are identical for self-supply for 
its own retail business and for providing access to its retail competitors on the wholesale market. If the 
regulated operator has a retail market share m, then its competitors have an overall market share (1 - 
m) generating wholesale revenues per unit of competitor’s market share.  
The above mathematical equation can be modified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After some elementary algebra, this leads to: 
 
 
This expression indicates that whether an economic replicability test is positive or negative directly 
depends on the sign of the difference in profitability between NGA investment and NGA wholesale 
business. The profitability of the NGA wholesale business activity has to be below the NGA Business 
Case for the economic replicability test to be positive. More specifically, the expression shows that if 
the NGA business case is negative, then the NGA wholesale activity (wholesale revenue - upstream 
costs) in the above formula will be even more negative if the economic replicability test is positive. 
The quotes provided at the beginning of this section indicate that it is already known, including by 
the European Commission, that the profitability of NGA investment is uncertain in the long term and 
certainly negative in the short timeframe of a customer lifetime. Therefore, a positive NGA economic 
replicability test that includes the fixed part of wholesale prices and is calculated for a customer 
lifetime can be obtained only if the profitability of the wholesale activity is negative. This type of test 
would thus guarantee the business profitability of the access seeker while weakening the upstream 
business, thereby making upstream investments economically irrational for investors. This formulation 
of the test is thus inconsistent with the EC’s assigned objective of sharing investment risks between 
SMP operators and access seekers (see precise quote from EC in this respect in footnote 4 page 2). 
The same point can be demonstrated using a simplified but representative numerical example based 
on Fibre to the Home (FTTH) investment (See the Appendix for a detailed hypothesis and an analysis 
of this numerical example). In this example, we demonstrate that if fixed wholesale prices are included 
in the test, then a negative result (implying a supposed foreclosure strategy) is obtained, even if it is 
abundantly clear there is no form of discrimination whatsoever. The example simulates an LRIC+ test 
using a DCF method and including all of the access seeker’s fixed and variable costs in the cost 
standard. 
We consider a case where the access seeker benefits from a fully cost-oriented non-discriminatory 
access from the FTTH investor (price equals cost in level and structure) and achieves a 50% market 
share. Therefore the access provider and the access seeker are facing exactly the same economic 
situation, which excludes any form of discrimination from the access provider against the access 
seeker. 
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We consider two ex ante demand scenarios: 
 Positive scenario: the spontaneous migration of customers from a copper network to an NGA 
is achieved in five years
7
 : the penetration rate p is equal to 20% in year 1, 40% in year 2, 60% 
in year 3, 80% in year 4, 100% in year 5; 
 Negative scenario: the migration is achieved in 20 years: the penetration rate increases by 5% 
each year 
We used two alternative calculation hypotheses where we conducted the test by alternately applying a 
customer lifetime of, for instance, 5 years and an infrastructure lifetime of 20 years. As mentioned 
above, the DCF method on a customer lifetime is recommended by the European Commission in the 
Recommendation published in September 2013.  
If we use a DCF method on a customer lifetime, we find that the profitability of FTTH 
investment is always negative, regardless of the speed of migration. 
If we then run the estimation using a DCF method on an infrastructure lifetime (20 years), 
results are uncertain because it depends on the length of the migration from copper to fibre network. 
The FTTH investment profitability is positive if we consider the optimistic scenario that the 
migration is achieved in five years and negative if the migration takes 20 years. Thus, assuming 
that the profitability of fibre investment is negative, the profitability of the wholesale business has to 
be negative to obtain a positive result in the economic replicability test. 
Consequently, in a case where it is abundantly clear there is no form of discrimination, an 
economic replicability test, including the access seeker’s fixed and variable costs, would however find 
that the operator behaves in a discriminatory manner; leading to a false positive. 
Therefore this formulation of the economic replicability test would squeeze upstream investments. 
The access price would have to be adjusted to secure the access seeker’s downstream business, thus 
transferring all the investment risk to the upstream wholesale business. This type of policy, which 
guarantees the access seeker’s profitability and weakens the upstream business case, would make 
extensive upstream investments economically irrational for fibre investors. 
This type of test, which is prone to systematic false positives, would be a powerful deterrent for 
investors. The specific analysis presented in this section holds as long as the cost standard of the 
economic replicability test fully covers the wholesale price paid by the access seeker: it holds for 
nonlinear wholesale prices with the fixed wholesale part included, e.g. as a mark-up on top of the 
variable wholesale part. It would also hold for fully linear wholesale prices, for which the above 
analysis would be strictly the same.  
3.2 An economic replicability test based on variable wholesale prices 
As mentioned before, the two-part wholesale price, in an NGA context, would be composed of: 
 A wholesale variable access price that directly depends on the number of customers; 
 A wholesale fixed cost which does not vary with the access seeker’s number of customers. 
The two-part structure makes it possible to accurately account for the singularity of an NGA investor’s 
cost structure characterized by a significant share of fixed costs. The economic replicability test 
could be operational only if the fixed wholesale costs are excluded from the test for two reasons: 
                                                     
7
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related to a mandatory copper switch-off. A forced migration would generate additional migration costs which are not 
considered here 
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 Difficulty in regulating fixed wholesale prices because the regulator is supposed to find a rule 
to spread the fixed costs among operators. It is possible to spread fixed costs based on market 
shares. However, in a growing market, it is likely that this distribution would rapidly become 
invalid. It seems difficult and hardly effective to constantly adapt regulations to market 
characteristics. In addition to these logistical impediments, and on a more fundamental level, 
adjusting fixed fees to market share would change fixed fees into variable fees and defeat the 
entire purpose of two-part prices; 
 The impossibility of running an LRIC+ test (including variable and fixed costs) using a DCF 
over a customer lifetime for the reasons described in subsection 3.1. Even over an infrastructure 
lifetime, the test would have a unpredictable outcome, depending on market conditions rather 
than incumbent operator behaviour. 
We therefore propose excluding the investment infrastructure fixed costs from the economic 
replicability test insofar as these fixed costs are translated into a fixed wholesale price. 
Hence, the economic replicability test becomes: 
 
prf ≥ avf + cf 
The NGA retail prices, prf, would be compared with the sum of wholesale variable NGA prices 
avf and to the NGA downstream cost cf. In this expression, the subscript “r” refer to “retail” (as 
opposed to wholesale), “f” to “fibre” for NGA networks (as opposed to copper), “v” to “variable” (as 
opposed to fixed). 
This formulation of the economic replicability test makes it possible to regulate the variable part of 
wholesale prices and guarantee fair competition between all competitors that access the NGA 
infrastructure. The test results would not be subject to the uncertainty of the NGA Business Case. 
However, this economic replicability test does not explain how to determine the fixed part of 
wholesale prices and, more specifically, it does not guarantee that a competitor as efficient as the 
investor can pay the fixed costs and migrate from a copper infrastructure to an NGA infrastructure and 
compete on NGA products. 
The introduction of a second “competition migration test” provides our answer to these questions. 
The wholesale fixed price will not be regulated by the NGA economic replicability test but can be 
efficiently negotiated between access providers and access seekers, if the access provider is also 
subjected to a second “competition migration test” designed to even out the bargaining balance in 
these negotiations. 
3.3 A transitory test to secure access for efficient entrants to NGA infrastructure: “the competition 
migration test” 
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper addresses the issue of designing the economic 
replicability test in cases for which nonlinear wholesale prices may be appropriate to fairly share 
investment risks. These cases are only relevant to the extent to which the roll out of the NGA network 
implies a replacement of the copper infrastructure by fibre investment. If only a small part of the 
copper infrastructure is replaced by fibre, e.g. If FTTN or FTTC solutions are used, then wholesale 
prices should be only weakly nonlinear (e.g. take the form of limited volume discounts) and the 
difference between our proposal and a conventional test will also be limited. However, if the entire 
copper infrastructure is replaced with fibre as in the case of FTTH architecture, wholesale prices will 
have strong nonlinear characteristics (e.g. co-financing, significant upfront payments or higher volume 
discounts) and the difference between our proposal and a conventional test will also be more 
significant.  
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We consider a situation where the initial retail market structure based on the copper market is 
competitive
8
 and  the  incumbent operator does not have significant market power in the retail 
copper-based broadband market. This means that it cannot directly control the migration of the bulk 
of retail customers from copper to NGA infrastructure. The market share resulting from the sole 
migration of its clients is presumably insufficient for amortising its NGA investment, otherwise its 
competitors could also develop and amortise profitably with their own alternative infrastructure and 
migrate their own retail customers to this alternative infrastructure. Complete infrastructure 
competition would be sustainable in this case, which is not the scenario analysed in this paper or 
covered by the European Commission Recommendation (2013). 
In other words, in the situation we are discussing, the NGA investor has no opportunity to make a 
profit from an NGA investment unless its copper-based competitors’ broadband customers migrate 
from its copper infrastructure to its NGA infrastructure. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that 
all relevant competitors initially offer copper services
9
. They all are at the top of the “copper” ladder 
and have to decide whether to enter the NGA market. During the technological transition, the 
operators that develop NGA access continue to offer copper services. 
To attract the greatest number of customers, the investor could then be tempted to practice very 
low retail prices—lower than those offered in the copper broadband market. At the same time, the 
investor could also be tempted to set high fixed prices for access to infrastructure to foreclose its 
competitors from the market insofar as the fixed costs are left out of the test. An economic 
replicability test based on variable prices, taken by itself, would not discourage such behaviour by 
investors. To prevent this, we introduce a second transitory test called the “competition migration test.  
The following parts of section 3.3. detail the mechanisms by which this additional test meets these 
objectives. 
3.3.1 The “competition test” 
The second test is meant to ensure migration of the broadband market’s competitive structure to the 
NGA market. 
The “competition migration test” ensures that the investor’s NGA retail prices do not foreclose 
copper-based efficient entrants. 
For this purpose, this test stipulates that an access provider’s retail NGA price should 
conduct an LRIC+ margin squeeze test on copper. At first glance, as the NGA network offers better 
quality than copper, it appears natural to also include an NGA premium which could be measured by 
the difference in consumer utility between copper and NGA networks. The test is thus formulated as 
follows:  
 
prf ≥ ac + cc + Uf - Uc 
Where prf as in §3.2. is the retail price for the NGA offer, ac is the wholesale regulated copper 
access charge, cc is the leader’s downstream cost, Uf is utility for a consumer with access to an 
NGA network and Uc is utility for a consumer with access to a copper network. Subscripts have 
the same meaning as in §3.2. 
However, the integration of the NGA premium raises the question of its real existence in the 
market and how to estimate it. 
                                                     
8
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9
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Consumer utility does not depend solely on the technical quality of the products. Increasing 
technical quality entails increasing usage value and safeguarding the overall quality of the consumer 
experience. Today, an observation of market data in most regions of the world does not indicate any 
significant difference in value between NGA and copper services. There is little or no premium 
observed in the pricing for NGA products around the world, particularly for the following reasons: 
 Currently few or no NGA-specific services; 
 A perception that copper networks are well-suited for customer usage: no perception of network 
congestion specific to copper access networks and copper and NGA networks share resources in 
the backhaul and transport networks; 
 From the consumer standpoint, the costs of migrating from copper to NGA (time and complexity 
of home NGA installation, compatibility issues with the customer’s existing equipment, change 
in how services are navigated, etc.). 
Furthermore, from an operational point of view, it appears difficult to estimate the difference in 
consumer utility between copper and NGA services. It could be possible to approximate it using the 
difference in consumer willingness to pay between fast and very fast broadband, but initially the 
data available would be only those of the incumbent which induces a problem of endogeneity. In the 
short term, the test should therefore be formulated as follows: 
 
prf ≥ ac + cc 
More fundamentally, the question of whether to include the NGA premium in the test is not limited to 
the observation of market practice or to technical constraints. Its integration may prove to be a 
strategic decision by the regulator in order to promote investment. 
If the analysis of market data reveals the existence of a premium, a regulator may consider whether 
to introduce it in the test, given that integrating the NGA premium tends to decrease both the 
incentive to migrate for access seekers and the incentive to invest for SMP operators in comparison 
with non-inclusion (see subsection 3.3.2. which describes the negotiation process). Furthermore, these 
behaviours are intrinsically linked. 
If the NGA premium is integrated into the test, the NGA retail price offered by the investor is 
likely to be less price competitive than the copper retail price chosen by the access seeker. The access 
seeker could thus decide to stay in the copper market and offer lower quality but also lower prices 
which can be a relevant short term strategy to minimise its costs. Access seekers are thus willing to 
pay less to have access to the NGA infrastructure; this reduces the investor’s returns on investment 
and thus discourages investments. 
At the same time, the investor can decide to increase its copper retail price to make NGA services 
more competitive and encourage its customers to migrate. However, if only its customers migrate, its 
benefits will be insufficient to amortise its investment. The lack of competitiveness of NGA services 
could lead the investor to underinvest. 
On the other hand, if the NGA premium is not included, the NGA prices proposed by the 
investor may be at least as competitive as the copper prices offered by its competitors while providing 
higher utility to consumers. Access seekers will feel strong pressure to adopt the new infrastructure 
and will thus be willing to pay more for fixed access to the NGA infrastructure. Hence, the utility of 
NGA investment will be returned to the investor, encouraging it to invest at a socially optimal level. 
Finally, since there is still competition between copper and NGA networks, the investor 
cannot set a high NGA retail price, otherwise too few customers would migrate and it would be 
unprofitable. 
We will consider in subsection 3.3.2. that the “competition migration test” does not include 
the NGA premium for all the reasons provided above. 
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3.3.2 Negociation process between the investor and the access seeker to determine the fixed 
infrastructure price 
By design, the “competition migration test” introduces a constraint in determining fixed infrastructure 
prices. The only way to achieve consumer migration on a sufficient scale is to encourage alternative 
operators to migrate along with their customers. Therefore, the investor must agree with each of its 
competitors on a wholesale fixed price that allows them to access the NGA infrastructure and operate 
in the NGA retail market. The constraint of the transitory “competition migration test” gives the 
alternative operators bargaining power to negotiate the wholesale access fixed price. 
As the “competition migration test” prevents the investor to lower its prices to attract the maximum 
number of clients to the NGA network, the only way to monetize its investment in new infrastructures 
is to ensure a level of fixed prices that would allow operators and their clients to migrate to the NGA 
network. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, the two alternative conditions for which the investor would not need 
its competitors’ clients to migrate en masse would be as follows: 
 The investor starts from a strongly dominant position in the copper-based broadband retail 
market, which would allow it to control the migration process of the whole copper customer 
base to NGA; this is not the standard situation considered in the EC Recommendation, which 
assumes that the initial copper-based broadband market is competitive, and therefore it is not the 
hypothesis retained in this paper. 
 The NGA investment is profitable, even with a limited number of customers. In this case, several 
operators could build their own profitable networks. The existence of such infrastructure-based 
competition would make the economic replicability test irrelevant. But this is not the hypothesis 
retained in the EC Recommendation and therefore in this paper. 
Outside of these two specific cases, investors need their competitors’ retail clients to migrate from 
copper to NGA to make their activity profitable. 
At the same time, as recommended by the European Commission, significant market power (SMP) 
operators and access seekers have to “share some of the investment risk by differentiating wholesale 
access prices according to the access seeker’s level of commitment.” 
In the absence of strong dominance by the incumbent in the broadband market, there is at least one 
large access based competitor. The incumbent and this access seeker will be in a position to negotiate 
the fixed fee the access seeker will accept to pay to access the NGA infrastructure. The two forces we 
just described will be in opposition: 
 The access seeker’s willingness to pay the lowest fixed fee and the investor’s need for the 
access seeker to migrate to the NGA network; 
 An objective where the investor and the access seeker share some of the investment risk in 
proportion to the market share that they anticipate obtaining in the retail market. 
It should be noted that both parties have reason to reach an agreement reasonably quickly: the 
incumbent because the profitability of its investment depends on its competitors’ customers migrating 
quickly and its largest rival because it would be a commercial risk to leave the incumbent alone on 
the NGA market or let the incumbent be the first to reach an agreement with another competitor. 
Moreover, once the incumbent has reached an agreement with one competitor on the fixed 
wholesale fee for accessing the NGA infrastructure, and as long as authorities apply the transitory 
“competition migration test,” it will feel strong pressure to agree with other competitors on their fixed 
fee. First, because a competitor that gains access to the NGA infrastructure may undercut its retail 
price and second, because these other competitors may negotiate access with both the incumbent and 
its initial competitor. 
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Once the authorities consider that negotiations on fixed wholesale access fees have generated an 
adequately competitive market structure on the NGA infrastructure and that each efficient access 
seeker has secured access to the NGA infrastructure, the second transitory test may be removed. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the reasoning developed here is designed for 
situations where the copper infrastructure is completely replaced by the NGA infrastructure. In 
intermediate cases of partial replacement, our proposal remains valid but with less significance to 
the extent that a two-part wholesale price structure would affect only the replaced proportion of the 
access infrastructure. 
Obviously, a formal microeconomic model on this qualitative reasoning would provide more 
rigorous insight into the likely outcome of the proposed process. In further research, it would be 
interesting to theoretically model the negotiation process described above to determine the level of 
the fixed equilibrium price. 
4. The proposed dual-test system in terms of existing regulatory theory and practice: 
overcoming the limits of the ladder of investment approach 
In this section, we discuss how our proposal of a dual-test system can be integrated into existing 
regulatory theory and practice. In particular, it is meant to overcome the well-known limits of the 
“ladder of investment” approach in the context of NGA investments and integrate the “business 
migration effect” developed by Bourreau et al. (2012). 
The “ladder of investment” (LoI) is a regulatory approach proposed by Cave (2006). The idea is to 
provide entrants with several levels of access to the incumbent network, the “rungs of the ladder,” 
in such a way that alternative operators can climb up the ladder and progressively develop their own 
infrastructure. From a theoretical point of view, this approach considers that service-based and 
facility-based entries are complementary and not two alternative ways of promoting competition. 
Since the very beginning, the “ladder of investment” approach has widely influenced the European 
telecommunications policy areas and broadband regulation. In its 2005 broadband market competition 
report, the European Regulators Group (ERG) analysed and explained the impact of regulatory 
intervention with the “ladder of investment concept.” In the Commission Recommendation of 20 
September 2010 on regulated access to Next- generation Access Networks, the European 
Commission indicates that “The appropriate array of remedies imposed by an NRA should reflect a 
proportionate application of the ladder of investment principle.” 
Some papers have already studied the application of the LoI approach in the NGA context (see 
Hori and Mizuno (2006), Vareda and Hoerning (2007), Cave (2010)). They recommend using 
instruments that are basically the same as those applied to regulate copper broadband (access prices 
increasing over time and regulatory holidays). The limits of the LoI approach in the NGA context 
are highlighted by Bacache et al. (2013). They used an empirical model with data from the 
European Commission to test the “ladder of investment approach” in the NGA context. The “ladder of 
investment” is composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access 
facilities. Bacache et al. found no empirical support for the LoI hypothesis in the transition from 
local loop unbundling to NGA infrastructures. In other words, they found that the number of 
unbundled lines has no impact on investment in new access infrastructures by new entrants. 
However, the literature considers a hypothesis where new technology is the next rung of this ladder 
and should immediately replace old technology: the investment decision is classified as “zero-one.” As 
Cave (2010) emphasised, the issue is more complex for NGAs. Regulators have to think vertically 
(i.e. how competing providers can climb the ladder by building their own fibre network) but also 
horizontally about movements from one  ladder  to another (see Figure 1). European operators are 
specifically in between the two ladders and operate on both networks; however, he “ladder of 
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investment” approach fails to explain this intermediary situation where different generations of 
technologies coexist. 
Figure 1. Migration between the ladders (Cave (2010)) 
 
The importance of analysing incentives to migrate from “old” to “new” technology has been put 
forward by Bourreau et al. (2012). Bourreau et al. (2012) use game theory to analyse the incentives 
for incumbents and entrants to migrate from “old” technology to “new” technology (the NGA 
network). They find that NGA-related investment incentives are impacted by access regulation charges 
in the “old” copper networks via three effects: 
 A “replacement effect” that reduces investment incentives for alternative operators when the 
“old” infrastructure access price is low; 
 A “wholesale revenue effect” where the old infrastructure revenue decreases with the 
access price. The incentive to invest in new infrastructure is related to the profitability of the 
access services on the old infrastructure; 
 The “business migration effect” which stipulates that there is a link between the wholesale and 
retail prices of the old infrastructure and the retail price of the new infrastructure. According to 
Bourreau et al. (2012), if the access price of the old infrastructure is low, then retail prices based 
on that network are low. To encourage customers to switch from the “old” infrastructure to the 
“new” infrastructure, operators should thus also offer low prices for NGA. In this case, the 
profitability of the new infrastructure is also low, as is the incentive to invest in NGA 
networks. Consequently, they demonstrate that “regulators cannot treat the two access prices to 
the two different technologies independently.” 
The objective of their paper is to determine the right level of copper prices to spur investment in an 
NGA network. Bourreau et al. (2012) conclude that if regulators want t o  e n c o u r a g e  the 
incumbents to invest in NGA, they cannot set wholesale copper prices at a low level. 
The “competition migration test” we propose is in the same vein as Bourreau et al. (2012), but 
we address a slightly different question. The idea is not to evaluate the impact of the legacy 
network’s wholesale access price on the incumbent’s NGA investment, but rather to analyse how 
copper prices can interfere with the implementation of NGA regulations. The interdependence between 
copper and fibre prices is materialized through this specific “competition migration test.” This test 
overcomes the limits of the “ladder of investment” approach integrating what Bourreau et al. (2012) 
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named the “business migration effect.” The formulation of the second test demonstrates that the 
interdependence between copper and NGA prices must also be considered when determining NGA 
retail prices. 
As explained previously, for the purpose of this paper, all competitors offer copper services and 
have to decide whether to enter the NGA market. During the technological transition, they develop 
NGA access keep wh i l e  maintaining copper services for a smooth migration between both 
generations of access networks in the presence of high infrastructure costs. 
Thus, a competitive provider could be in a transitional phase, represented by the “grey zone” in 
Figure 2 where the investment decision is not 0 or 1 but somewhere between the two. Through the 
NGA regulation, one of the objectives of the regulator is to make sure that the entrants migrate from 
the “copper” ladder to the “NGA” ladder, in other words to help operators cross the bridge depicted 
in Figure 2. 
The set of two tests proposed in this paper, notably with the introduction of an interdependence 
condition between old and new infrastructure prices are innovative tools to ensure “the business 
migration” but also the “competitive structure migration.” 
The economic replicability test based on variable wholesale prices regulates the variable part of the 
wholesale price and thus guarantees fair competition between all competitors that access the NGA 
infrastructure. The second test ensures that efficient operators can pay the fixed price to secure access 
to the NGA. 
Migration between the ladders accounting for interdependence between old and new 
infrastructures (adapted from Cave (2010) 
“Business migration effect” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Defining the economic replicability test for NGA services is a highly topical issue. It must be 
accurate in order to avoid discouraging investment because, as we have demonstrated in this paper, 
NGA economics are incompatible with the conventional margin squeeze test used by regulators. 
This paper addresses the question of how to implement the economic replicability test for 
NGA networks. This test is required by the Recommendation to regulate wholesale prices and 
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takes into account t h e  f a c t  that, as the Recommendation itself suggests, nonlinear wholesale 
pricing is appropriate to better reconcile investment and competition than linear wholesale pricing.  
The test must a l s o  be built in a way that fulfils the EC’s double objective of encouraging 
NGA investment and preserving the competitive structure inherited from copper unbundling while 
obeying the principle of fair allocation of investment risks between access providers and access 
seekers. 
This paper demonstrates that in order to be operational and consistent with the Recommendation’s 
objectives, the NGA economic replicability test must exclude the fixed part of wholesale prices. 
However, while excluding the fixed part of wholesale prices from the cost standard of the NGA 
economic replicability test is necessary to meet the European Commission’s policy objective, it is not 
sufficient. A single economic replicability test cannot explain how to determine fixed wholesale 
prices and, in particular, it does not guarantee that an operator which is as efficient as the investor 
can pay the fixed costs and have access to the NGA infrastructure. We therefore propose adding a 
second t r a n s i t o r y  test called the “competition migration test” which ensures that during the 
transition phase the incumbent’s NGA retail and wholesale prices will not foreclose copper-based 
efficient entrants, and gives access seekers sufficient bargaining power to reach a balanced agreement on 
the fixed wholesale price with the access provider. The second test is meant to preserve the 
competitive structure inherited from unbundling regulations on the copper market by ensuring that a 
competitive market structure can migrate from copper to NGA infrastructure. 
This pair of tests overcomes the limits of “the ladder of investment” theory by integrating “the 
business migration effect” concept developed by Bourreau et al. (2012). These two tests solve the 
dynamic consistency issue that Europe is facing: encouraging NGA investment while preserving the 
benefits of competitive markets. This economic analysis would also be relevant for a margin squeeze 
test under competition law. 
The concept of two-part access prices, with a different form of regulation for each part of the tariffs 
may have broader applications than the one described here. However ,  this specification does not 
claim to be a general theory that is robust in all circumstances. It is only relevant for meeting the 
double requirement of infrastructure investment and competitive structure safeguards in European 
fixed telecommunications markets. 
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Appendix: Numerical example showing that a conventional interpretation of the LRIC+ 
NGA economic replicability test would be an inappropriate benchmark to identify 
discriminatory behaviour  
In this appendix, we use a numerical example to perform an LRIC+ test using a DCF method over a 
customer lifetime, including the fixed and variable parts of the wholesale price in the cost standard, 
following what we refer to here as a conventional interpretation of the economic replicability test 
presented by the European Commission in its Recommendation. The example shows that this type of 
test would almost certainly produce a negative result, even absent any form of discrimination between 
the access provider investing in an NGA network and the access seeker. If the test is performed as a 
DCF over the infrastructure lifetime instead of the customer lifetime, the numerical example shows 
that the outcome may be positive or negative depending on the market conditions and absent any form 
of discrimination between the access provider and the access seeker. 
This numerical analysis serve as a counter example to prove that a conventional interpretation of 
the “economic replicability test” is not a reliable benchmark for detecting economic discrimination 
between the access provider and the access seeker, although this is the role assigned to this test in the 
EC recommendation. To prove the irrelevance of a conventional interpretation of the test as a means 
of detecting discrimination, there is no need to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the possible 
results of the test in a large spectrum of configurations. A single counter example for a reasonable 
configuration is logically enough to discard the belief that a conventional version of the test could 
adequately identify economic discrimination. 
The test is done using the specific case of an FTTH investment rather than a more general NGA 
example. FTTH is one of the main cases of interest, corresponding to the full replacement of the 
copper loop by an investment in fibre infrastructure. Any other form of NGA would be an 
intermediate case, with the effects reduced proportionately as compared with FTTH. 
The figures given in the numerical example have been chosen to be reasonable and are to be 
taken as an illustration only. They are drawn from public sources or from internal sources which are in 
line with generally known figures, although they should not be considered directly representative of 
any specific operator. 
Here we will describe the effects of an LRIC+ economic replicability test in a scenario with 
asymmetric access to passive infrastructures where the fixed and variable parts of wholesale prices are 
both included in the cost standard. 
We first describe the general cost and demand features of the FTTH investment case before 
considering the case of an access seeker, and performing the conventional version of the LRIC+ 
economic replicability test.  
1. Costs estimation 
Companies face both investment costs and operational variable costs when deploying fibre 
infrastructure for their clients. 
1.1. Investment costs 
We consider a global average investment cost of €1000 per FTTH customer, which may be split 
roughly 70%-30% into two parts:  
- To serve FFTH customers, an operator must first deploy its infrastructure, which generates an 
investment cost per eligible customer (a customer who has access to fibre infrastructure). For all 
eligible FTTH customers, we suppose that the investment cost of access to the passive 
mutualised FTTH infrastructure is €700 per eligible customer.  
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- For commercial FTTH customers, the investment cost to build a n  individual fibre drop line 
is €300 per contracted FTTH customer.  
These hypotheses are globally consistent with consensus among consultants and experts
10
.  
We assume an infrastructure lifetime of 20 years, in line with the accounting lifetime used in 
documents such as Orange’s published accounts. We use a 5 year customer lifetime, which is in the 
high range of the figures typically used by regulatory and competition authorities.  
1.2. Variable downstream costs (DC) 
When an eligible customer adopts the service and becomes a commercial customer, the operator 
faces a variable cost per commercial customer. For commercial customers, the company has to bear 
three types of variable downstream costs: 
 Costs of networks, commercial resources and activities shared with ADSL customers, which 
can be estimated around €15 per month per customer; 
 Costs of specific FTTH commercial network resources and activities, outside the access 
infrastructure estimated at €10*(1-p) per month per customer, p being the ratio of commercial 
FTTH customers to all eligible FTTH customers, i.e. the penetration rate. These costs represent 
the specific technical and commercial efforts that the operator must deploy to encourage and 
support the migration of ADSL customers to FTTH infrastructure (door-to-door campaigns, 
initial specific processes and problem solving, higher core network costs due to higher usage). 
These extra costs are high when FTTH is marginal and drop as the FTTH penetration rate 
increases, thanks to the learning curve and the (hopefully) increasing appeal of FTTH access to 
customers. 
 Cost-oriented price for duct usage, i.e. € 3 per month per customer, on top of FTTH infrastructure 
cost. 
To summarise, in our model, variable downstream costs per month per customer are DC = € (15+10(1-
p)+3) 
2. Demand estimation 
As mentioned above we call p the ratio of commercial FTTH customers to all eligible FTTH 
customers, i.e. the penetration rate. We consider two ex ante demand scenarios: 
 Positive scenario: p = up 20% per year after investment, which indicates that the migration 
is achieved in five years (p = 20% in year 1, 40% in year 2, 60% in year 3, 80% in year 4, 
100% in year 5); 
                                                     
10
 In Analysys (2006) : “Fibre in the last mile: le business case for FTTP and VDSL”, Analysys Research Limited, 
Cambridge (UK) as quoted in WIK-consult “The Economics of next generation access” (2008), page 12, FTTP-GPON 
costs around €1000 in investments. 
 J-L Silicani, Chairman of Arcep, French regulator 16th Nov 2011, Idate Digiworld summit, 21 billion to cover all 25 
million French, excluding costs for final drop and customer premise. 
 Minimal optimal FTTH investment cost for dense urban, should cost €809 following a cost model from an equipment 
manufacturer (Juan Rendon Schneir, Yupeng Xiong, Huawei, Communication at the 24th Regional Conference of the 
International Telecommunications Society, Florence, Italy October 2013.  
 In “NGA network deployment costs” Idate Research M12304-December 2012, the Executive Summary p.5 indicates 
€229 billion in investment for full FTTH/B of the 212 million households of Europe 27. 
 In “FTTx business models” Idate Consulting&Research M81508 – January 2009, p.25 Fig 8, indicates around €1500 in 
investments for FTTH technology, 25-30% for subscriber connections.  
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 Negative scenario: p = up 5% per year after investment, which implies that the 
migration is achieved in 20 years. 
The positive scenario of spontaneous and fast migration of the demand should not be confused with a 
scenario of forced migration related to a mandatory copper switch-off. A forced migration would 
generate additional migration costs which are not considered here. 
The average revenue per user (ARPU) for an FFTH commercial customer is estimated at € 35 
per month, in line with values observed in Western Europe’s most competitive retail markets. 
3. Modelled access seeker  
We will suppose in this example that the access seeker benefits from a situation where it does not 
suffer from any form of disadvantage or discrimination compared with the investor: 
 50% market share; 
 Cost-oriented wholesale price, which here means 50% of a €700 upfront investment per potential 
customer, plus €300 investment per commercial customer, 
 Wholesale duct price is €3 per month per FTTH commercial customer; 
 Same downstream cost as the incumbent: DC = € (15+10(1-p)+3) including duct price, following 
the EEO (Equivalently Efficient Operator) hypothesis supported by EC Recommendation. 
4. Calculation of a conventional LRIC+ economic replicability test.  
Consistently with the model of the access seeker detailed in the above paragraph, the discounted cash 
flows outcome reflect the results of the LRIC+ economic replicability test when the competitor has 
exactly the same business case that the investor (50% market share, same costs and same 
revenues). So it is clear that the access seeker does not suffer from any form of discrimination when 
compared with the access provider. However, applying a conventional version of the LRIC+ 
economic replicability test would lead to opposite conclusion: according to the test, the access seeker 
would be supposedly discriminated, as the test will be negative. Thus the exercise shows that such a 
version of the test cannot be used as a reliable tool to characterise discrimination.  
Further information is required in order to fully specify the DCF calculation: 
- The cost of capital is presumed to be 10% (WACC: weighted average cost of capital). 
- We considered two alternative d u r a t i o n s  t o  calculate the DCF: we conducted the test by 
alternating between a customer lifetime of five years and an infrastructure lifetime of twenty years. 
- The terminal value at the end of duration of the DCF calculation in principle reflects the residual 
economic life of the physical asset and acquired customers. The European Commission defined 
the terminal value which should be taken into account for a DCF calculation as follows in the 
Telefónica case
11
: the terminal value should be equal to the net accounting value, i.e. the 
cumulated investment minus the cumulated linear depreciation of assets
12
. 
The above elements fully specify the DCF calculation. Test results are given in Figure 3 below: 
  
                                                     
11
 COMMISSION DECISION of 04.07.2007 relating to a proceedings under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica) 
12
 “The size of this terminal value is the cost of unrecovered assets (physical assets and acquisition costs) remaining to be 
recovered after the five-year period of the analysis”. (Commission decision of 04.07.2007, (363)) 
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Figure 3. Economic replicability test results 
 
The test is systematically negative (infringement of the economic replicability condition) when 
performed using a DCF method for a customer lifetime (five years). When we ran the test using a 
DCF method and the infrastructure lifetime (twenty years), the results were uncertain depending on 
the length of the migration from copper to fibre network. The test is positive only under the favourable 
hypothesis that the migration is achieved in five years and negative if the migration takes twenty years. 
Thus with this formulation of the test, an FTTH investor could be accused of not complying with 
the economic replicability test in a situation where there is no actual discrimination and where the 
result of the test depends of market conditions and not on discriminatory behaviour.  
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